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669 307, 320, v. Identity, § 4. A); impression of self always present and lively, 317.

§ 3. Three classes of, conveyed by the senses, (a) figure, bulk, motion, and solidity; (b) colours, tastes, smells, heat, etc.; (c) pains and pleasures: all these as felt and as far as the senses are judges are the same in the manner of their existence, 193; but to the first and sometimes to the second kind we attribute continued existence, while the third kind we regard as merely perceptions, 194 f.; 'all impressions are internal and perishing existences, and appear as such,' 194, 251; distinction of modern philosophy between impressions which do and do not resemble the qualities of the objects which produce them, 226 f.; no impression from which idea of body can be derived: touch cannot give it us, 'for though bodies are felt by means of their solidity, yet the feeling is quite a different thing from the solidity, and they have not the least resemblance to each other, 230.

§ 4 (v. Idea, § 2). Only associated by resemblance, 283, 343; one impression related to another 'not only when their sensations are resembling but also when their impulses or directions are similar or correspondent, 381, 384, 394; identity of impressions produces a stronger connexion than the most perfect resemblance, 341; impressions and passions capable of an entire union, as opposed to ideas, 366; double relation of impressions and ideas, 286, 381 (v. Pride); no new impression and so no new passion produced by association of ideas, 305, law of transition of, 342; opposed to that of idea; 342; an idea converted into an impression in sympathy, 317, even when the impression is not felt by any body, 370, 385.

§ 5. Whether it is by our impressions or ideas we distinguish between virtue and vice, 456 f. (v. Moral, § 1, 2); the impression which distinguishes virtue and vice often mistaken for an idea because it is soft and gentle, 470.

Indifference=chance, 125, 408; liberty of, confused with liberty of spontaneity, 407.

Indirect—and direct passions, 276; or oblique effect of custom, 197.

Indolence—why excused, 587.

Inference—(v. Belief, Cause), does not necessarily require three ideas, 97 n.

Infinite—divisibility of space and time, 26 f., of points, lines, etc., 44, of quantity, 52.

Inhesion—no idea of substance or inhesion, 234.

Instinct—'reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls, which arises from past experience' 179; as opposed to reflection=imagination as opposed to reason, 215; benevolence, love of life, kindness to children, instincts originally implanted in our natures, 417; the mind by an original instinct seeks to unite