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668 Imagination—contrasted with memory, 8 f., 86, 93, 97 n, 628 (cf. 265), with memory and reason, 117, with experience, 140, with judgment, 148-9, with understanding, 97, 267 (cf. 182); has power to transpose and change ideas, 10, 92, 629; chiefly occupied in forming complex ideas, 10; associates ideas on certain principles. to; which are sometimes 'permanent, irresistible, and universal,' at others weak, changeable, irregular, and not even useful in conduct of life, 225 (cf. 148); and so leads us into directly contrary opinions, 266 (cf. 231); the understanding='the general and more established properties of the imagination, 267; this activity of imagination only natural as a malady is natural, and so rejected by Philosophy, 216; passes from obscure to lively ideas, 339; but conversely in the case of the passions, 340-345 (cf. 509 n); vibration of, between two ideas, constitutes a perfect relation, 355; extends 'custom and reasoning beyond the perceptions,' 197; continues in its course even when its object fails, like a boat under way: completes an imperfect uniformity, 198, 213, 237; source of general rules, 371, 385, 504 n; little influenced by abstruse reasonings, 185, 268; more affected by what is contiguous than what is remote, hence government becomes necessary, 535; and the passions, 340 f.; by a great effort enables us to sympathise with an unfelt feeling, 371, 385-6; converts an idea into an impression in sympathy (q.v.) 47; source of rules which determine property, 594 n, 509 n, 513, 531, 559, 566; animals little susceptible of pleasures or pains of imagination, 397.

Immortality—of soul, 114.

Impressions (v. Idea, Feeling, Senses, Sensation).

§ 1. Of sensation and reflexion: the latter derived principally from ideas, the former 'arise in the soul originally from unknown causes,' 7, 84; original impressions depend on physical and natural causes, 275; the determination of the mind to pass from the idea of an object to that of its usual attendant an impression of reflexion, 165, 275; pains and pleasures original impressions, passions secondary or reflective, 276; reflective, divided roughly into calm and violent, passions being violent and divided into direct and indirect, 276; simple and complex, 2; an exception to the rule that every simple idea has a preceding impression, 6; simple and uniform impressions undefinable, 277, 329; will an internal impression, 399; impressions which give rise to sense of justice not natural but artificial, 497; impression of extension itself extended, 239.

§ 2. Cannot be presented by the senses as anything but impressions: must necessarily appear what they are and be what they appear, 190; not felt as different from ourselves or as copies of anything else, 189; not felt as external to ourselves, 191; how far there is an impression of ourselves, very doubtful, 190, 251 (cf.