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666 448, 458; understanding either compares ideas or infers matters of fact, 463.

§ 4. abstract or general, 17 f.; are nothing but particular ideas annexed to a certain term which gives them a more extensive signification, 17; the particular circumstances are not discarded but retained, 18; every idea determinate in quality and quantity, and individual, 19; abstract ideas therefore individual in themselves, 20; and become 'general in their representation' because annexed to a name which revives a certain custom of surveying other individuals to which it is applied, 20-24; no abstract idea of power, 161; nor of existence, 623 (cf. 66 f.).

§ 5. of space and time, 33 f.; derived from the manner in which impressions appear, 34, 37 (cf. 96); mathematical, 45 f., 52, 72; of existence and external existence, 66 f.; of causation, 74 f., and necessity, derived from an impression of reflexion, 155, 165; of body, 229 f., and substance, 232; of extension, itself extended, 239; of self, 251 f. (v. Identity); of God, 248; of mother person. of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are not conscious,' 329; of another's affection, though it be not actually felt by any one (v. Sympathy). 370 (cf. 385).

Identity.

§ 1. The most universal relation, 14; discovered rather by perception than reasoning, except when discovered by relation of causation, 74; a relation which does not 'depend upon the idea' and hence only a source of probability, 73; of impressions produces a stronger connexion than the most perfect resemblance, 341.

§ 2. A. The &#39;principium individuationis&#39; 200 f.; one object only gives idea of unity, a multiplicity of objects the idea of number: Time or Duration the source of idea of identity, 200; 'an object is the same with itself'='an object existent at one time is the same with itself existent at another:' the 'principium' is nothing but the invariableness and uninterruptedness of any object through a supposed variation of time, 201.

§ 2. B. The identity of a mass of matter is preserved for us (a) when the variation is small in proportion to the whole, and gradual, 256; (b) when the parts combine to a common end, and especially when there is a 'sympathy of parts' as in an organism, 257; (c) when the object is naturally variable—e.g. a river, 258.

§ 3. The constancy of our impressions, i.e. their resemblance at different times, makes us consider them individually the same, 199, 202, 253 f.; a succession of related impressions places the mind in the same disposition as does an identical object, 203, and so we confound succession with identity, 204; two kinds of resemblance produce this confusion, 204 n; but this supposed identity is contradicted by the obvious interruption of our perceptions. and we