Page:Treatise of Human Nature (1888).djvu/686

662 2. (v. Moral, § 2); when you pronounce an act vicious you only mean that you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it, 469; 'morality more properly felt than judged of' 470, 589; we do not infer a character to be virtuous because it pleases: but in feeling that it pleases, we in fact feel that it is virtuous, 471; pleasure includes many different kinds of feeling, 472; moral distinctions depend entirely on certain peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure excited by a mental quality in ourselves or others, 574; 'a convenient house and a virtuous character cause not the same feeling of approbation, though the source of our approbation be the same:' 'there is something very inexplicable in this variation of our feelings,' 617; each of the virtues excites a different feeling of approbation in the spectator, and so the fact that the natural abilities and moral virtues excite different feelings of approbation is no reason for placing them in distinct classes, 607.

§ 8. Requires correction by reflection and understanding, 417, 581. 6o3, 672 (v. Sensation, Senses).

Fear—and probability, 440; caused by a mixture of joy and grief. 441 f.

Fiction (v. Belief § 1)—of duration as a measure of rest, 37, 65; of perfect equality, 48; of continued and distinct existence of perceptions, 193 f.; this fiction believed, 209, derived from custom, but obliquely and indirectly, 197; of double existence of perceptions and objects, 211 f., altogether the offspring of the fancy, 216; of substance or matter, 220; of substantial forms, 221; of accidents, 222; of faculties and occult qualities, sympathies, and antipathies in Nature, 224; of personal identity, soul, self, and substance, to disguise the variation of our perceptions, 254, 259; philosophic fiction of 'state of Nature,' 493; poetic, of 'golden age.' 494 (cf. 631); of 'willing an obligation,' 523; of imperfect dominion, 529; examination of, useful in the same way as examination of our dreams, 219.

Final cause, 171.

Fitness—not a principle to be used in assigning property, 502.

Force—and vivacity, vagueness of terms, 105, 629 (v. Belief); differs from agitation, 631 (cf. 419); invalidates promises: a proof that they have no natural obligation, for 'force is not essentially different from any other motive of hope and fear,' 525.

Form—substantial, fiction of, 221.

Formal cause, 171.

Free, will—(v. Necessity, Liberty, Will), 312, 314, 399 f., 6o9.

Freedom.

Friendship—exists side by side with the 'interested commerce of men.' 521.