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660 basing its proof of existence of body on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, renders that existence impossible. 226 f.; all our perceptions may exist separately and have no need ol anything to support their existence, 232 (v. Mind, § 1).

'Existential judgments do not imply union of two ideas, 96 fr.

Expectation—explains distinction between- power and the exercise of it, 313 (v. Cause § 9. B).

Experience—opposed to knowledge and scientific reasoning, 82 (cf. 157): its nature illustrated, 87; the basis of inference, 87; yields certainty in arguments from cause (q.v., § 7. B) and effect, 124 (cf. 623); imperfect and contradicted experience yields probability, 131; contrariety in, due to secret operation of concealed causes, 132; no justification of inference to objects beyond our experience, 139; contrasted with a 'voluntary act of imagination,' experience being united by a 'common object producing them,' while experiments are not, 149; experience and idea of efficacy, 157 f.

Experiment—valid inference after a single experiment, 105 (v. Cause § 7. B); by means of principle of uniformity of nature, 131; 'in arguing to the future every past experiment has the same weight, and 'tis only a superior number of them which can throw the balance on any side, 136; concurrence of experiments 'increases the vivacity of a view,' 138 (cf. 140).

Extension.

§—29 f. a number according to the common sentiment of metaphysicians, 31; consists of indivisible parts, because the idea of such an extension implies no contradiction, 33; idea of extension acquired by considering distance between bodies: is a copy of coloured points and of the manner of their appearance, 34 (cf. 235 f.); distinguished from duration as having co-existent parts, 36; these parts are indivisible ideas copied from impressions of coloured and tangible objects, 38; mathematical definitions and demonstrations opposed in the matter of extension, 42; confusion with distance, 61; theory of Cartesian, 159.

§ 2—and solidify, as primary qualities, 227; if colours; sounds, etc., be merely perceptions, not even motion, extension, and solidity can possess 'real continued and independent existence,' 228 (cf. 192); motion implies a body moving: body resolved into extension or solidity: extension can only be conceived as composed of parts endowed with colour or solidity: colour is excluded ex hypothesi: therefore idea of extension depends for its reality on that of solidity, 228; but solidity can only be explained as dependent on colour, or on extension, 229.

§ 3—and thought: argument from their incompatibility to the immateriality of the soul (v. Mind), 234 f.; only things coloured and tangible are extended, 235 (cf. 34, 38); thus all perceptions,