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659 ideas, 223: results from use of general rules and yet can only be corrected by them, 146-149 (v. Cause, § 8. D); does not constitute vice, whether it is caused by or causes an action, 459 f.; mistakes of fact not criminal, 459; mistakes of right not source of immorality, but imply an antecedent morality, 460.

Essential and accidental circumstances in an antecedent confused by imagination and distinguished by judgment by aid of general rules, 148, 149 (cf. 173)

Esteem—for rich and powerful, 357 f., mainly derived from sympathy rather than expectation of advantage, 361 (cf. 616); love and esteem, 608 n.

Evidence—moral and natural, 404, 406 (v. Cause, § 11).

Exemplary—cause, 171.

Exercise—distinction between exercise and possession of power (q. v.) frivolous, but holds a place in the philosophy of our passions, 511, 360 (cf. 12, 172).

Existence.

§ 1. Whatever appears impossible on comparison of certain ideas must be really impossible, 39; of an idea proved by our talking about it, 32 (but cf. 62); 'whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the idea of possible existence,' 32; reality of objects of mathematics proved by our possession of a clear idea of them, 43 (cf. 52, 89); 'real existence and matter of fact,' opposed to 'relations of ideas,' 458, 463 (cf. 413); the idea of the existence of an object is the same as the idea of the object, 66 (cf. 94, 153, 623); 'any idea we please to form is the idea of a being and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form,' 67 (cf. 189, 190); idea of external existence as something specifically different from ideas and impressions impossible, 67 (cf. 188): only a 'relative idea' of external objects possible, 68; we have no abstract 'idea of existence and so belief in existence of an object is not the conjunction of the idea of existence to the simple conception of the object. 623. (v. Belief, § 4. 5, Cause, § 7. A).

§ 2. Idea of continued and distinct existence of perceptions (q. v.) not derived from the senses, 188-192, for to the senses there is no distinction between appearance (q. v.) and existence, 189; 'all actions and sensations of the mind must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear,' 190; not derived from reason, 193; but from imagination, which leads to the distinction between appearance and existance, to the idea of continued existence and distinct existence, 194-209, to conceal the contradictions in which suppositions, philosophers have invented the idea of &#39;double existence&#39; and distinguish between that of objects (q.v.) and that of perceptions, 211; but it is impossible to argue from existence of impressions to that of objects, 212; but this system is the 'monstrous offspring' of two contrary principles, 213; modern philosophy,