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657 Deliberate—distinction between deliberate and casual actions implies doctrine of necessity, 412.

Delivery—symbolical, in transfer of property, (q. v.) 575.

Demonstration—and probability, 31; mathematical demonstrations, 42, 166, not properly demonstrations because founded on inexact ideas, 45 f; implies absolute impossibility of the contrary, 161 (cf. 166); the rules of demonstrative science certain and infallible but faculties liable to err in their application, 180; discovers proportions of ideas considered as such, 448; four demonstrable relations—Resemblance, contrariety, degree in quality, proportions in quantity or number, 464; no matter of fact capable of being demonstrated, 463.

Regards abstract relations of ideas: its province is 'the world of ideas,' while will places us in that of realities: thus demonstration and volition are totally removed from each other, 413; only indirectly influences our actions, 414; why demonstration pleases, 449; opinion 'that morality is susceptible of demonstration,' criticised—no one has ever advanced a single step in this demonstration, 463.

Design—to be inferred in actions of animals, 176; on the part of a person assisting or injuring us increases our love or hatred, because it points to certain qualities in him 'which remain after the action is performed,' and by which we are affected through sympathy, 348-9; all actions artificial as performed from design, 475.

Desire—a direct passion, 438 (cf. 278, 514); arises from good considered simply, 439; 'the mind by an original instinct seeks to unite itself with the good and to avoid the evil, though they be conceived merely in idea, and be considered as to exist in any future period of time,' 438; desire of harm to enemies and happiness to friends, lust, hunger, &c., are direct passions which 'arise from a natural impulse and instinct which is perfectly unaccountable': 'these passions strictly speaking produce good and evil and proceed not from them like the other affections,' 439.

Attends love and hatred, and distinguishes them &om pride and humility which are pure emotions in the soul, 367.

Calm desires often confused with reason, 417; such are benevolence, love of life, kindness to children, which are 'instincts originally implanted in our nature:" also 'the general appetite to good and aversion to evil considered as such,' 417; (cf. 438); calm passions often determine the will in opposition to the violent; &#39;'tis not the present uneasiness alone which determines men:' strength of mind is prevalence of the calm passions over the violent, 418 (v. Passion, § 3).

Difference—a negation of relation: has two kinds, 15; different, distinguishable, separable by thought or imagination—relation of these terms, 18; methods of, and agreement, 300, 301, 311.

Direct—passions (q. v.), 278, 438.

Direction—parallel directions of impressions a source of relation