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656 ' in an oblique and artificial manner, 'in the case of an inference after one experiment, 105 (cf. 197); assures us of the principle of the uniformity of nature, 105, 134; there is a 'full and perfect habit' to transfer the past to the future, 155; scepticism confirms the view that all reasonings from cause and effect are founded on custom, 183 (cf. 140).

Two kinds of, one indirectly producing a vivid idea and belief, the other directly, e.g. education, 116; but the latter an artificial, and not a natural cause, and so regarded by philosophers as a fallacious ground of assent to any opinion, 117; nor does a voluntary repetition of experiments produce a proper custom. 140.

An imperfect habit a direct source of probability, 130; (v. Cause § 8 C.); a perfect habit divided an indirect source. 133 f., it is 'broken into pieces and diffused' by contrary experience, and reunited afterwards by the concurrence of experience, 135.

A source of unphilosophical probability, and also its only remedy, 146 f; in the form of general rules (q. v.) influences judgment even contrary to present observation and experience, 147; hence causes an opposition between imagination and judgment.

§ 4. (v. Body) the argument from the coherence of our perceptions to their continued existence based on custom, but still is quite different from our arguments from cause and effect, for 'this inference arises from the understanding and custom in an indirect and oblique manner, 197 (cf. 105, 133); no regularity of our perceptions can lead us to infer a greater degree of regularity in some objects which are not perceived, for this supposes a contradiction, via. 'a habit acquired by what was never present to the mind,' 197, 'this extension of custom and reasoning beyond the perceptions can never be the direct and natural effect of the constant repetition and connexion, but must arise from the cooperation of some other principles,' viz. those of imagination, 198.

§ 5. 'Readily carries us beyond the just bounds in our passions, as well as in our reasonings,' 293; gives us a good opinion of ourselves, because the mind finds a satisfaction and ease in the view of objects to which it is accustomed,' 355.

Has great power to increase and diminish passions; has two original effects on the mind: produces a facility in performance or conception. and afterwards a tendency or inclination, 422; facility when too great converts pleasure into pain, 415; increases all active habits, but diminishes passive, 414; source of relation of present possession as a title to property, 503.

Decorum—612.

Definition—of cause, 179; of simple impressions impossible, 277, 319, 399.