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642 Actions—merit of, only exists so far as they proceed from something constant and durable in a man, from a character, and thus requires the doctrine of necessity, 411, 575 (cf. 632); only character and actions capable of exciting the peculiar pleasure which is called virtue, 471; 'when we praise any actions we regard only the motives that produced them;' 'actions are only signs of certain principles in the mind and temper,' the external performance has no merit. 477; we blame a man for not doing an action, as not being influenced by the proper motive of that action, 477; 'the first virtuous motive which bestows a merit on any action can never be a regard to the virtue of that action.' 478; 'no action can be virtuous or morally good unless there is in human nature some motive to produce it distinct from the sense of its morality,' 479; intention in the agent necessary to morality in the action, 461 and n.

Agent—necessity of an action no quality in the agent, 408 (cf. 632); intention in the agent, 461.

[Agreement]—method of, 300, 301, 311.

Allegiance—v. Government, 539 f.

Ambition—an inferior species of, 300.

Analogy—a third kind of probability, 142, 147; leads us beyond experience, 209; feeling of belief can only be explained by analogy with other feelings, 624.

Ancient—philosophy, 219 f.

Anger—and benevolence, 366; not all angry passions vicious: detectable in form of cruelty, 605.

Animals—reason of, inferred from resemblance of their actions to our own, 176; man superior to animals chiefly from superiority of his reason, 326, 610; theories of mind to be tested by their power of explaining actions of mind in animals and children and common people, 177 (cf. 325); ordinary actions of, imply inference based on experience and belief; 178; identity which we attribute to mind of man like that which we attribute to plants and animals, 253 f.; 'sympathy of parts' of animals to a common end, 257; pride and humility oi, 324, due to same causes as in men, 326, 327; have no sense of virtue and vice, and incapable of relations of right and property, 326; sympathy observable through whole animal creation, 363, 398; love and hatred of, 397; little susceptible of pleasures or pains of imagination, 397; possess will and direct passions in same way as men, 448; animals have no morality, therefore morality cannot consist in a relation: illustration from incest, 468.

Appearance—and existence and reality are for the senses identical, 188 f.; all sensations are felt by the mind as they really are, 189; 'all actions and sensations of the mind must necessarily appear in every particular what they are and be what they appear, 190 (cf. 385, 417, 583, 603, 632); the distinction between appearance and existence due to imagination, 193 f.; we could have no language or conversation