Page:Tolstoy - Christianity and Patriotism.djvu/80

 sentiment, but, on the contrary, a very stupid and very immoral one: stupid because, if every state is to think itself superior to all the others, it is obvious that they will all be wrong; and immoral because it inevitably inclines every man who feels it to endeavour to obtain advantages for his own state and nation to the detriment of other states and nations-an inclination directly opposed to the fundamental moral law acknowledged by all: not to do to others what we would not they should do unto us.

Patriotism may have been a virtue in the ancient world when it exacted from a man the service of the ideal of the fatherland, the highest attainable by man at that period. But how can patriotism be a virtue in our day when it requires from men, not the recognition of the equality and brotherhood of all men, but the recognition of one state and nationality as predominant over all the rest—which is directly opposed to the ideal of our religion and morality. Far from this sentiment being a virtue nowadays, it is an unmistakable vice; the sentiment—that is, patriotism in its true meaning—cannot even exist in our day because there are neither material nor moral grounds for it.

Patriotism might have a meaning in the ancient world when each nation, consisting more or less of the same race, professing one