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126 parking place shall not be deemed to be part of a street by reason only of its being situated under a street. (2) The powers of a local authority under the said section sixty-eight to acquire, utilise, and adapt land shall include powers to acquire, utilise, and adapt land (including any right in, over, or under land) for the purpose of providing means of entrance to and egress from any parking place and, notwithstanding anything in subsection (4) of the said section, the said power to adapt land shall include power to adapt land being part of a street for the purpose aforesaid with the consent of the authority or person responsible for the maintenance of the street.

(3) The powers of a local authority under the said section sixty-eight shall include powers to let for use as a parking place any parking place provided by them not being part of a street.

(4) Subsection (6) of the said section sixty-eight (which relates to the power of a local authority to make regulations as to the matters therein specified) shall have effect as if for the word “regulations” there were therein substituted, in all places where that word occurs, the word “byelaws” and in relation to any byelaws made under the said subsection references in section two hundred and fifty of the Local Government Act, 1933, to “the confirming authority” shall be construed as references to the Minister of Health.

APPENDIX C. EXCESS CONDEMNATION FOR PURPOSE OF RECOUPMENT SUPREME COURT DECISION, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, AND EXPERIENCE IN PRACTICE Following is a digest of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cincinnati v. Vester (281 U. 8. 439 (1929)):

These three cases were heard together. The suits were brought by owners of land in the city of Cincinnati to restrain the appropriation of their property by the city, upon the grounds that the taking was not in accordance with the applicable provisions of the constitution and statutes of Ohio and would constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment, it being alleged that the appropriation was not for a public use. Under the law of Ohio these questions could be raised only by injunction proceedings. P. C. C. & St. L. Railway Co. v. Greenville (69 O. S. 487, 496); Sargent v. Cincinnati (110 O. S. 444). Decrees in favor of plaintiffs for a permanent injunction were entered in the district court and were affirmed by the circuit court of appeals (33 F. (2d) 242). This court granted writs of certiorari, 280 U. S. 545.

The controversy relates to what is known as “excess condemnation,” that is, the taking of more land than is needed to be occupied by the improvement directly in contemplation. The constitution of Ohio provides (art. XVIII, sec. 10):

“A municipality appropriating or otherwise acquiring property for public use may in furtherance of such public use appropriate or acquire an excess over that actually to be occupied by the improvement, and may sell such excess with such restrictions as shall be appropriate to preserve the improvement made. Bonds may be issued to supply the funds in whole or in part to pay for the excess property so appropriated or otherwise acquired, but said bonds shall be a lien only against the property so acquired for the improvement and excess, and they shall not be a liability of the municipality nor be included in any limitation of the bonded indebtedness of such municipality prescribed by law.”

Among the statutory provisions of Ohio relating to the condemnation of property by municipal corporations is the following with respect to the declaration of the purpose of the appropriation (General Code of Ohio, sec. 3679):

“. Resolution shall be passed. When it is deemed necessary to appropriate property, council shall pass a resolution, declaring such intent, defining