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 Title 3--The President MEMOP-\177/\177DUM OF JUSTIFICATION FOR PK/ZSIDENTIAL DETERMINATION ON MAJOR DRUG TRANSIT OR ILLICIT DRUG PRODUCING COUNTRIES FOR FY 2007 Venezuela Venezuela failed demonstrably to make sufficient efforts during the last 12 months to meet its obligations under international counternarcotics agresments and U.S. domestic counternarcotics requirements as set forth in section 489(a) (1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. This determination comes as the result of Venezuela's lack of effective response to specific United States Government requests for counternarcotics cooperation as well as the country's continued lack of action against drug trafficking within and through its borders commensurate with its responsibilities to the inter\177ational community. Venezuela's importance as a tranmshipment point for drugs bound for the Urnired States and Europe has continued to increase in the past 12 months, a situation both enabled and exploited by corrupt Venezuelan officials. The Venezuelan media provided an example o\177 this corruption when they reported that Venezuelan police re-sold the vast majority of a 9,400 kilogram cocaine seizure tc drug traffickers in July of this year (Venezuela does not allow independent verification of seizure amounts). Seizures cf illegal drugs transiting the country have fallen, according to PEA estimates. The volume of cocaine transiting the countiy is expected to continue to rise substantially in 2006. .The most dramatic increase in cocaine departing Venezuela was to non-U.S. destinations, primarily Europe. The vast majority of cocaine going to the United States or Europe goes by sea. However, an increasing proportion is being moved by non-commercial air through the Caribbean toward the United States. The number of suspected drug flights departing Venezuela and going to Hispaniola and the Caribbean more than doubled in 2005 and has continued that rising trend in the first half of 2006. Venezuela has not used available tools to counter the growing drug threat. It has not strengthened inspections or security along its border with Colombia; it has not utilized judicial wiretap orders to investigate drug cases; it has not attempted meaningful prosecution of corrupt officials; and it has not renewed formal counternarcotics cooperation agreements with the 310

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