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 Other Presidential Documents The t\177ahamas, t\177olivia, t\177razil, t\177urma, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ec- uador, Guatemala, Haiti, India, }amaica, Laos, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. A country's presence on the Maiors List is not necessarily an adverse re- flection of its government's counternarcotics efforts or level of cooperation with the United States. Consistent with the statutory definition of a maior drug transit or drug producing country set forth in section 481(e)(2) and (5) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), one of the rea- sons that maior drug transit or illicit drug producing countries are placed on the list is the combination of geographical, commercial, and economic factors that allow drugs to transit or be produced despite the concerned government's most assiduous enforcement measures. Pursuant to section 706(2)(A) of the FRAA, I hereby designate Burma and Venezuela as countries that have failed demonstrably during the previous \1772 months to adhere to their obligations under international counter- narcotics agreements and take the measures set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the FAA. Attached to this report (Tab A) are iustifications for the deter- minations on Burma and Venezuela, as required by section 706(2)(t\177). I have also determined, in accordance with provisions of section 706(3)(A) of the FRAA, that support for programs to aid Venezuela's democratic insti- tutions is vital to the national interests of the United States. Although President Karzai has strongly attacked narcotrafficking as the greatest threat to Afghanistan, one third of the Afghan economy remains opium-based, which contributes to widespread public corruption. The gov- ernment at all levels must be held accountable to deter and eradicate poppy cultivation; remove and prosecute corrupt officials; and investigate, prosecute, or extradite narcotraffickers and those financing their activities. We are concerned that failure to act decisively now could undermine secu- rity, compromise democratic legitimacy, and imperil international support for vital assistance. My Administration is concerned with the decline in Bolivian counter- narcotics cooperation since October 2005. Bolivia, the world's third largest producer of cocaine, has undertaken policies that have allowed the expan- sion of coca cultivation and slowed the pace of eradication until mid-year, when it picked up. The Government of t\177olivia's (GOB) policy of "zero co- caine, but not zero coca" has focused primarily on interdiction, to the near exclusion of its necessary complements, eradication and alternative devel- opment. However, the GOB has been supportive of interdiction initiatives and has had positive results in seizing cocaine and decommissioning rustic labs. We would encourage the GOB to refocus its efforts on eliminating ex- cess coca, the source of cocaine. This would include eradicating at least 5,000 hectares, including in the Chapare region; eliminating the "cato" ex- emption to Bolivian law; rescinding Ministerial Resolution \17712, Adminis- trative Resolution 083, and establishing tight controls on the sale of licit coca leaf for traditional use; and implementing strong precursor chemical control measures to prevent conversion of coca to cocaine. My Administra- tion plans to review t\177olivia's performance in these specific areas within 6 months. 305

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