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 Title 3--The President by 94 percent, thereby reducing the global annual supply by nearly 75 per- cent. Although the Tallban successfully prevented cultivation, opium traf- ficking and heroin processing continued unabated through 200% indicating the existence of large stockpiles of opium in the region used to control the opium market. At no point did the Tallban take any steps to adhere to its international obligations to interrupt opium trafficking or trade. In addition, cultivation and opium production increased in former Northern Alliance territory of Afghanistan. Drug traffickers in Afghanistan have switched alle- giances from the Tallban to local commanders and warlords and available information indicates that poppy cultivation has resumed in several areas of Afghanistan since last fall. Although the new Afghan Interim Authority led by Hamid Karzai has made a commitment to fight the production and trafficking of drugs in Afghani- stan consistent with the Bonn Agreement of December 200% it will take several months and significant assistance from the international community before the Interim Authority can take concrete measures to eradicate poppy and counter drug trafficking in Afghanistan. In the coming months, I will continue to monitor the Interim Authority's counternarcotics efforts close- ly. In the meantime, it is in the vital national interest of the United States to provide the full range of U.S. assistance to support the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Afghanistan poppy farmers must have viable alternatives to poppy cultivation that provide a sustainable income. The Afghan Interim Authority will need to establish rule of law and a basic law enforcement capacity at the local and regional level for its counternarcotics strategy to succeed. More broadly, although the United States' military campaign in Afghanistan has been successful, it is essential to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a haven for terrorists. Stabilizing Afghanistan by providing various forms of assistance, including economic and military as- sistance in addition to counternarcotics, anti-crime, and humanitarian as- sistance is essential. STATEMENT OF EXPLANATION Burma Burma has failed demonstrably during the last \1772 months to make substan- tial efforts to adhere to its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and to take the counternarcotics measures set forth in section 489(a)(\177) of the Foreign Assistance Act of \17796\177, as amended. With the ban on opium production in Afghanistan imposed by the Tallban in 200% Burma returned to its position as the world's largest producer of illicit opium. Burma is also the primary source of methamphetamines trafficked throughout Southeast Asia and has done little to stop the production of an estimated 800 million tablets annually and trafficking of these drugs. Burma has taken some useful counternarcotics measures in the last year, but these measures are too limited in duration and scope to constitute a substantial effort to meet the standards set forth under U.S. law. Burma's \177993 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law conforms to the \177988 UN Drug Convention and contains useful legal tools for ad- dressing money laundering, seizing drug-related assets, and prosecuting drug conspiracy cases, but the Government of Burma (GOB) has been slow to implement the law. Burma has not enforced its existing money-laun- dering laws. In 200% Burma was placed on the Financial Action Task 280

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