Page:Title 3 CFR 2000 Compilation.djvu/368

 Title 3--The President In 1999 the GOG began imp]ementation of its nationa] drug po]icy, the anti-drug master plan and national strategy which incorporates both de- mand and supply reduction obiectives to be accomplished by specified ministries. The GOG provided additional funding to the plan's implemen- ters to attack the alarming increase in drug abuse documented last year. The GOG also took maior steps in implementing assets seizure and pre- cursor chemicals regulations. Haiti Haiti is a significant transshipment point for drugs, primarily cocaine, moving through the Caribbean from South America to the United States. The USG cannot certify Haiti as having fully cooperated with the United States on drug control, or as having taken adequate steps on its own, to meet the goals and obiectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention, to which Haiti is a party. However, U.S. vital national interests require that foreign assistance continue to be provided to Haiti. The USG recognizes that because Haiti had no Parliament during \177999, no legislation could be enacted or international agreements ratified. How- ever, Haiti failed to make sufficient progress on many anti-drug obiectives that did not require parliamentary action, but only implementation by the Government of Haiti (GOH). The GOH failed to: draft or update any pend- ing anti-money laundering or anti-corruption legislation; revise and imple- ment the draft national drug control strategy; create mechanisms to enforce standards of conduct and liabilities for GOH officials in accordance with the Declaration of Principles signed by Haiti at the \177997 Bridgetown Sum- mit; vigorously investigate and prosecute drug-related corruption involving GOH officials; resolve and report on the "450 kilo affair" in which police- men were allegedly involved in the \177998 theft of a large cocaine shipment; set up a special financial analysis unit to combat money laundering; and ioin the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). Haiti also failed to make sufficient progress in the area of law enforce- ment. Part of its overall lack of success in this area is due to Haiti's inad- equate iudicial system; the still limited capabilities of the five-year-old Hai- tian National Police (HNP); and the inexperience of the three-year-old po- lice anti-drug unit (t\177LTS). In addition, the HNP currently does not have the ability to intercept drug airdrops. The GOH failed to increase its drug seizure rate over \177998's performance; the amount of cocaine seized in 1999 was one-third that of \177998, although the estimated flow of cocaine in- creased by nearly one-quarter. The GOH also failed to double the size of the t\177LTS as planned, or to enforce interagency cooperation between the HNP and the customs and immigration services. This lack of cooperation continues to impede counter-drug efforts inside the customs control areas at the airport and other ports of entry in Haiti. GOH's international cooperation in \177999 was significant, including ongo- ing implementation of the \177997 U.S.-Haiti maritime counter-drug interdic- tion agreement even though parliamentary action to bring the agreement into force has not yet been accomplished. GOH cooperated with several international counter-drug operations, one of which resulted in the arrest and expulsion from Haiti of two key members of a maior international drug operation. Haitian authorities also continued to work with their counter- drug counterparts in the Dominican Republic to stem the flow of illicit drugs over the land border. 368

�