Page:Thomas v. Lumpkin (Supreme Court).pdf/9

Rh Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771, n. 14 (1970)). Strickland requires a defendant who claims ineffective assistance of counsel to prove (1) “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) that any deficiency was “prejudicial to the defense.” 466 U. S., at 688, 692. Thomas has met both requirements.

Thomas’ counsel fell far below an objective standard of reasonableness. In a written questionnaire, four prospective jurors admitted that they either “oppose[d]” or “vigorously oppose[d]” interracial marriage and procreation. Yet counsel questioned only one of them (the third juror) about their views on race, and as Judge Higginson recognized in dissent below, that juror “never retreated from his ‘beliefs about interracial marriage.’ ” 995 F. 3d, at 461.

Counsel asked no questions at all about race of the other three prospective jurors, each of whom had also expressed opposition to interracial marriage. This Court has recognized that specific questioning may be required where there is a “constitutionally significant likelihood that, absent questioning about racial prejudice,” the State would not impanel an impartial jury. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U. S. 589, 596 (1976). In Turner v. Murray, 476 U. S. 28 (1986), the Court specifically held that “a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias.” Id., at 36–37. The Court based that decision in part on the broad discretion, and resulting potential for prejudice, given to a jury during the prejudice phase of a capital trial. Id., at 35 (plurality opinion). The Court held, nevertheless, that the trial judge’s “failure to question