Page:Thomas v. Lumpkin (Supreme Court).pdf/7

Rh Second-chair counsel gave substantively the same explanation. Id., at 1764. Using identical language, both declared that “[f]or those jurors who expressed some problem with interracial relationships, either [co-counsel] or I questioned them to the extent necessary for us to request a strike for cause or make a decision to use a strike against them.” Id., at 1748, 1764–1765.

The state habeas court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing. It denied Thomas’ impartial-jury argument on the merits because the state court saw “no evidence that the jury’s decision was racially motivated.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 329a. The court dismissed Thomas’ ineffective-assistance claim because Thomas “failed to overcome the presumption that trial counsel was effective during voir dire questioning.” Id., at 373a. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas adopted the lower court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id., at 292a.

Thomas then filed a federal habeas petition raising the same juror-bias and ineffective-assistance claims. The District Court denied the petition, deeming the juror-bias claim “speculative,” and finding that defense counsel’s “decision to forego questioning three of the four jurors about racial bias was simply a matter of trial strategy.” Id., at 121a, 125a. In a divided opinion, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The panel agreed that the state habeas court’s finding that there was “ ‘no evidence that the jury’s decision was racially motivated’ ” was “not directly on point as to whether any juror with a relevant bias that made him or her unable to be impartial was seated on the jury.” 995 F. 3d, at 444. Nevertheless, the majority concluded that the state court made a “necessary implicit finding … that no juror would base his decision on race rather than the evidence presented.” Ibid.

With respect to Thomas’ ineffective-assistance claim, the panel determined that the state habeas court was not ob-