Page:Thomas v. Lumpkin (Supreme Court).pdf/10

10 the venire on racial prejudice” is not by itself erroneous unless the “defendant has specifically requested such an inquiry,” effectively putting the burden on defendants’ attorneys to protect this right. Id., at 37.

There is no doubt that the facts of this case make out the “constitutionally significant likelihood” under which specific questioning is required. This is a capital case involving interracial violence where three seated jurors and an alternate expressed prejudicial views. Had defense counsel requested individual voir dire of the three prospective jurors, it would have been reversible error for the trial judge to deny that request. See id., at 36 (plurality opinion); id., at 36–37 (majority opinion). Counsel’s failure to do so was constitutionally ineffective.

The state habeas court’s unexplained contrary conclusion was objectively unreasonable. Although the challenged jurors gave general affirmations when the trial judge asked if they would “make up [their] mind based on the evidence,” see, e.g., App. to Pet. for Cert. 116a, those answers to general questioning do not absolve defense counsel of failing to question the jurors about racial bias and its potential impact on the verdict and penalty phase deliberations. As this Court has long explained, when a juror “admit[s] prejudice,” general statements of impartiality “can be given little weight.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717, 728 (1961); see also Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U. S. 524, 526 (1973) (“three general questions as to bias, prejudice, or partiality” were insufficient where trial judge refused to examine jurors about racial prejudice).

Moreover, while trial counsel has wide latitude to make strategic decisions during voir dire, there was no excuse in this case for their failure to ask the three other jurors questions similar to those that counsel asked juror number four. Trial counsel initially admitted as much, swearing in affidavits that counsel’s failure to probe the jurors’ views “was not intentional” before subsequently attesting that counsel