Page:The works of the Rev. John Wesley, M.A., late fellow of Lincoln-College, Oxford (IA worksofrevjohnwe3wesl).pdf/72

 decent from man, to call the supreme God, to give an account to him! Nevertheless, with awe and reverence we may speak a little. The Lord pardon us, if we speak amiss!

7. It seems then, that the whole difficulty arises, from considering God's will as distinct from God. Otherwise it vanishes away. For none can doubt, but God is the cause of the law of God. But the will of God is God himself. It is God considered as willing thus or thus. Consequently, to say, That the will of God, or that God himself is the cause of the law, is one and the same thing.

8. * Again; if the law, the immutable rule of right and wrong, depends on the nature and fitnesses of things, and on their essential relations to each other: (I do not say, their eternal relations; because the eternal relation of things existing in time, is little less than a contradiction:) if, I say, this depends on the nature and relations of things, then it must depend on God, or the will of God: because those things themselves, with all their relations, are the works of his hands. By his will, for his pleasure alone, they all are and were created.

9. And yet it may be granted (which is probably all that a considerate person would contend for) that in every particular case, God wills this or this (suppose that men should honour their parents) because it is right, agreeable to the