Page:The works of Plato, A new and literal version, (vol 6) (Burges, 1854).djvu/42

30 be the assertions of us, now thinking in this way; all of which has been stated with reference to Justice, the punisher of the impious. [11.] With respect however to that, which has been brought to a test, it is not possible for us to disbelieve, that we ought not to consider the good to be wise.

Let us then see, whether to this wisdom, of which we were of old in search, we can direct our mind either by education or art; and being wanting in the knowledge of which we should be ignorant of things just. Being such we seem to me, and we must speak. For after seeking up and down, I will endeavour to make it at the end plain to you in the way it has become very plain to myself. The greatest part of virtue, when it is not practised correctly, becomes the cause (of ignorance), as, from what has been said, the thing itself seems to me to signify forcibly. But let no one persuade us, that there is any (part) of virtue belonging to the race of mortals greater than piety. Now that this does not exist in the best natures through ignorance, we must declare; since the best are those, which are produced with the greatest difficulty, and which, when produced, are of the greatest benefit. For the soul, that receives moderately and mildly what belongs to a nature slow and the reverse, would be of an easy disposition; and admiring fortitude, and being obedient towards temperance, and, what is the greatest in these natures, able to learn, and with a good memory, it would be able to rejoice much in things of this kind, so as to be a lover of learning. For these things are not easy to be produced; and when they are produced, and meet with the nurture and education of which there is a need, they would be able