Page:The whole familiar colloquies of Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam.djvu/278

274 Bu. And must we take care of that on account of the law, and this on account of the vow? Fi. Yes.

Bu. Suppose the pope should make a law that nobody should marry any one within the seventh degree of affinity, would he be guilty of a sin that should marry a cousin in the sixth degree? Fi. In my opinion he would. Bu. What if a bishop should put forth an edict that nobody should have to do with his wife but on a Monday, Thursday, and Saturday, would he be guilty of a sin that should have to do with her upon other days? Fi. I think he would. Bu. What if he should enjoin that nobody should eat bulbous roots? Fi. What does that signify to piety? Bu. Because bulbous roots are provocatives, but what I say of bulbs, I say even of the herb rocket. Fi. I cannot well tell. Bu. Why cannot you tell where lies the force of obligation in human laws? Fi. In the words of St. Paul, Be obedient to those that are set over you. Bu. Upon this foot the constitution of a bishop and magistrate binds all persons. Fi. Yes, if it be just and lawfully made. Bu. But who shall be judge of that? Fi. He that made it; for he that makes the law ought to interpret it.

Bu. What, then, must we be obedient to all constitutions without distinction? Fi. I think we should. Bu. What if a fool or a wicked person be set over us, and he make a foolish and wicked law, must we abide by his judgment, and must the people obey, as having no right to judge? Fi. What signifies it to suppose what is not? Bu. He that succours his father, and would not succour him unless the law obliged him to it, does he fulfil the law or not? Fi. No, I think he does not. Bu. Why not? Fi. In the first place, because he does not fulfil the will of the lawgiver; secondly, he adds hypocrisy to his wicked will. Bu. If he fasts that would not fast unless the church required him, does he satisfy the law? Fi. You change both the author of the law and the matter of it. Bu. Well, then, compare a Jew, if he fasting upon days appointed would not fast unless the law required him, with Christ, who, keeping a fast appointed by men, would not keep it if there were no law for it; or, if you had rather, a Jew abstaining from swine's flesh, and a Christian abstaining from flesh and milk-meats on Friday. Fi. I believe there ought to be some grains of allowance made to infirmity, though the law be against it; but not so to him that on purpose acts and murmurs against a law.

Bu. But you do allow that the divine laws do not always oblige to eternal damnation. Fi. Why should I not? Bu. But do you not dare to own that there is any human law which does not bind to the same penalty, but leave a man in suspense? Then you seem to attribute something more to the laws of men than to the laws of God. Lying and backbiting are evil in their own nature, and forbidden by God himself, and yet you acknowledge that some kind of lies and backbitings do not bind a person to the punishment of hell; and yet you do not dare to exempt a person from the same punishment that upon any condition whatsoever eats flesh on a Friday. Fi. It is none of my business to acquit or condemn any one.

Bu. If divine and human laws bind equally alike, what difference is there between one and the other? Fi. This difference, that he that transgresses a human law sins immediately against man (if you will allow me to use school terms), but mediately against God; he that