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 opinion to approve "the action of the Government, in preferring justice to revenge, and the best interests of South Africa to the vain pursuit of military glory." This idle declamation of course begs the whole question. No right-thinking man desires "military glory" for glory's sake, but a salutary chastisement of the rebel Boers was necessary for the upholding of that power and reputation of Great Britain which the "best interests of Africa" so much require. When you are dealing with savage and with semi-civilised races, it is necessary to appeal to feelings which they understand and appreciate, and all the "tall talk" of all the Chamberlains that ever charmed a Birmingham audience with high-flown eloquence will not come home to the minds of the Boers or of the native tribes with the same power of persuasion as the display of physical force and the proved determination of Great Britain to be supreme in South Africa. The Government actually allowed an armistice, during which, while the British troops were to remain within their camp, the rebels were permitted to remain upon British territory which they had invaded. It appeared as if the honour of the British flag, the safety of the loyal Colonists, the prestige of the British name were all as nothing to the Administration, so that they could please the advocates of "peace at any price," and put a stop to the expenditure in which they were involved by the war. Mr. Sellar tells us that there can be no doubt that Sir Evelyn Wood, at the head of 12,000 British troops, could have subjugated the Boers. But do the Boers think so? In a letter to Mankorana, a native chief, warning him not to aid the British, the acting Commandant-General of the Boers speaks of "our enemies the English Government, which we have already overthrown," and says, moreover, "we alone are able to workout the English." The plea of "moral courage" may be understood by men of education and refinement, but to the natives and Boers the change of front of the British Government seems only to have been dictated by the fear of further disasters, a fear expressed with tolerable clearness by Lord Kimberley in the debate recently brought on by Lord Cairns, when he hinted at the possible danger to our troops of an attack upon their flank by Free State Boers, who might take part against us if we continued the war.

What, then, is the position of affairs in South Africa at the present moment, and what the prospects of the future? All is dark indeed. To be an Englishman, to have been loyal, to have believed in the word of the British Government—these are deep misfortunes to any man. Englishmen and loyal Boers have lost relations, lands, and property, and their chance of obtaining restitution or compensation may be judged of by the past behaviour of the Government. British officials will be disbelieved, British evidence discredited, and the Boers allowed to have it all their own way. Then, Lord Kimberley, in his instructions to the Commission now sitting to arrange for the future of the Transvaal, suggests the taking off a slice of