Page:The theory of psychoanalysis (IA theoryofpsychoan00jungiala).pdf/68

 *conscious, the patient of course knows nothing about their existence, and it would be absurd to make direct inquiries about them. Nevertheless it is often said, both by patients and by so-called normal persons: "But if I had such phantasies, surely I would know something about them." But what is unconscious is, in fact, something which one does not know. The opposition too is perfectly convinced that such things as unconscious phantasies could not exist. This a priori judgment is scholasticism, and has no sensible grounds. We cannot possibly rest on the dogma that consciousness only is mind, when we can convince ourselves daily that our consciousness is only the stage. When the contents of our consciousness appear they are already in a highly complex form; the grouping of our thoughts from the elements supplied by our memory is almost entirely unconscious. Therefore we are obliged, whether we like it or not, to accept for the moment the conception of an unconscious psychic sphere, even if only as a mere negative, border-conception, just as Kant's "thing in itself." As we perceive things which do not have their origin in consciousness, we are obliged to give hypothetic contents to the sphere of the non-conscious. We must suppose that the origin of certain effects lies in the unconscious, just because they are not conscious. The reproach of mysticism can scarcely be made against this conception of the unconscious. We do not pretend that we know anything positive, or can affirm anything, about the psychic condition of the unconscious. Instead, we have substituted symbols by following the way of designation and abstraction we apply in consciousness.

On the axiom: Principia præter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda, this kind of ideation is the only possible one. Hence we speak about the effects of the unconscious, just as we do about the phenomena of the conscious. Many people have been shocked by Freud's statement: "The unconscious can only wish," and this is regarded as an unheard of metaphysical assertion, something like the principle of Hartman's "Philosophy of the Unconscious," which apparently administers a rebuff to the theory of cognition. This indignation only arises from the fact that the critics, unknown to themselves, evidently start from a metaphysical conception of the unconscious as being an "end per se," and naïvely project on to us their inadequate conception of