Page:The rise and fall of the Emperor Maximilian.djvu/33

Rh were a previously assured certainty. It was easy to foresee that in any case of rebuff, the ruin of this idea would accelerate and irretrievably precipitate the downfall of Latin influence in America, and would for ever destroy its prestige, which the Spaniards had done so much to compromise. But if this idea was to triumph, it needed the co-operation of the United States themselves. It is very certain that there was a favourable opportunity in 1862, looking at the secession of the Southern States from those of the North. Then was the time for France to have acted vigorously, and to have obtained allies even in the enemy's camp. Two courses were open, and both were practicable; but here we shall not pretend to decide between them. Either it was necessary at the first onset to decide in good earnest for the cause of the Union, and to restrain the South by a threatening demonstration on the frontier of the Rio Bravo; or, if the belligerent character of the secession party was recognised, it was essential to go the whole length without hesitation, and to consummate the work of separation by declaring openly for the planters of the Southern States, who, fired with the recollections of French glory, waited but the succour of our promise to triumphantly offer a helping hand to our expeditionary force which was marching on Mexico. Through an inconsistency which one can now, on looking back, hardly conceive possible, the imperial policy wandered away from every logical tradition. The belligerent character which had been accorded to the Southern States served only to prolong to no purpose a sanguinary contest; and our government repulsed the reiterated overtures of the Southern proprietors, whom they encouraged, as it were, only yesterday, and finally abandoned to their fate. From