Page:The rise and fall of the Emperor Maximilian.djvu/285

Rh nearer than two days' march. This was the language used to Porfirio Diaz, to Ruis and to Riva Palacios.

After a mature examination of all the contradictory documents, we are fully persuaded that the French government had wrongly thought that they should find in the marshal a docile instrument of its policy, and that he would be prompt in comprehending mere desires, and be ready of his own accord to ensure their success. In this ambiguous path, which seems authorised in modern diplomacy, military honour runs a risk of being led astray. There is no doubt that his position was a false one; but the marshal was preserved by his soldier-like honesty of purpose, and always held himself harmless behind his written instructions. If we wish to be further convinced of this, it will be sufficient if we examine the despatch from Napoleon III. which arrived by the American route, addressed to General Castelnau. The emperor, since the arrival of his aide-de-camp in Mexico, no longer communicated directly with the marshal.

Paris, January 10, 1867. Received despatch of December 7th. Do not force the emperor to abdicate; but do not delay the departure of the troops. Send home all who do not wish to stay.

What fresh event could have called forth this explicit despatch? Certainly it must have been the refusal of the commander-in-chief to take a part in violent measures against the sovereign whom he was commissioned to defend. General Castelnau was, it is true, armed with full powers; but this despatch seems to prove that he was not provided with written instructions, which would perhaps have been too compromising to the French policy. The compliance of the marshal