Page:The recall of the judiciary in California. A summary of reasons against recalling judges at popular elections (IA recallofjudiciar00denm).pdf/9

 power to recall at popular election. In other words, the Southern Pacific will control our Supreme Court unless we apply to it the popular election and the popular recall, and the Southern Pacific will control the railroad commission unless we deny to it popular election and popular recall.

Perhaps we can now understand what Senator Works meant by “reform run mad”. Happily other excellent enactments of this session of the legislature are not marred by such inconsistency.

13. Because a self-respecting candidate will hesitate to run in the recall election under the law as framed. Under the law there is no vacancy unless a majority vote is polled to recall the incumbent. The new candidate’s name goes on the same ballot that settles the recall—that is to say, he becomes a candidate for a position that is not vacant. A man might spend weeks canvassing the state, obtain a plurality of votes and beat all his opponents, and still not be elected because there is no vacancy on account of the failure to recall the incumbent.

To sum it up, the settlement of the necessity for recalling a judge at a popular election calls on the average voter to make a decision he has not the special knowledge to make. It places the incumbent in fear of removal by men without the time or the special information or training necessary to give him a fair hearing. It would make weak judges weaker, and deter strong and self-respecting men from becoming candidates for the bench.