Page:The old paths, or The Talmud tested by Scripture.djvu/455



"If a man swear a rash oath concerning the future, but lies in that which he has sworn, as, if he should swear not to eat this bread, and afterwards should eat it; and if, after he has eaten it, before he brings his sacrifice, in case he did it ignorantly, or before he is flogged, in case he did it presumptuously—he repent and ask a wise man, and he absolve him, behold such an one is exempt from the sacrifice or from the flogging: and not only so, but if they had actually bound him in order to flog him, and he ask a wise man, and he absolve him before the flogging has commenced, he is exempt." (Ibid. 18.) In this rabbinic decision there are two cases, and both contrary to the Word of God. First, we have the case of the man who has broken his oath ignorantly, and respecting whom God has decided in the following words: "If a soul swear, pronouncing with his lips to do evil, or to do good, whatsoever it be that a man shall pronounce with an oath, and it be hid from him; when he knoweth of it, then he shall be guilty in one of these. And it shall be, when he shall be guilty in one of these things, that he shall confess that he hath sinned in that thing: and he shall bring his trespass-offering unto the Lord for his sin which he hath sinned," &c. (Levit. v. 4, &c.) Here God positively commands, first, that he should confess his sin, and secondly, that he should bring a sacrifice in order to obtain forgiveness; and, by the above law, the rabbies as positively declare that obedience to these commands is superfluous. A man need only say that he has changed his mind, and get a rabbi to absolve him, and then he can set the Word of God at defiance, he need neither confess his sin, nor bring the sacrifice. How can the men who profess such a religion pretend to have any regard for the law of Moses, or how can they with any consistency reproach Christians with the non-observance of the ceremonial precepts, when they themselves profess religious principles which unceremoniously subvert such plain commands? The second case is, however, far more flagrant. It supposes a man to have sworn that he would not do a certain thing, but afterwards wilfully to have done it—that is, it supposes a man to have been guilty of wilful perjury, and yet declares that he may be delivered both from the guilt and the punishment, by