Page:The invasion of the Crimea vol. 1.djvu/73

 BETWEEN THE GZAB AND THE SULTAN. 31 thus aggrieved takes fire, as it ought to do, and chap, determines to resist or avenge the aggression, it jj_ is generally able to embroil other States ; and the result is that the Prince who is the wrong-doer finds himself involved in a war which — having a tendency to become greater and greater — can hardly be otherwise than formidable to him. It is the apprehension of this result which is the main safeguard of peace. Any prince who might be inclined to do a wrong to another State casts his eyes abroad to see the condition of the great Powers. If he observes that they are all in a sound state, and headed by firm, able rulers, who are equal, if need be, to the duty of taking up arms, he knows that his contemplated outrage would produce a war of which he cannot foresee the scope or limit, and, unless he be a madman or a desperado desiring war for war's sake, he will be inclined to hold back. On the other hand, if he sees that any great nation which ought to be foremost to resist him is in a state of exceptional weakness, or under the governance of unworthy or incapable rulers, or is distracted by some whim or sentiment interfering with her accustomed policy, then, perhaps, he allows him- self to entertain a hope that she may not have the spirit or the wisdom to perform her duty. That is the hope, and it may be said in these days it is the one only hope, which would drive a sane prince to become the disturber of Europe. To frustrate this hope — in other words, to keep alive the dread of a just and avenging war — should be the care