Page:The invasion of the Crimea vol. 1.djvu/403

 BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 361 the singleness of purpose observed in a decided c H a p. man is the result of a close accord between the 1_ two engines of thought, and not of actual unity. Certainly it would appear that the Emperor Louis Xapoleon, more than most other men, was accus- tomed to linger in doubt between two conflicting plans, and to delay Ids final adoption of the one, and his final rejection of the other, for as long a time as possible, in order to find out what might be best to be ultimately done by carrying on ex- periments for many months together with two rival schemes of action. But whether this double method of action was the result of idiosyncrasy or of a profound policy, it was but too w T ell fittted for the object of draw- ing England into a war. The aim of the French Emperor was to keep his understanding with England in full force, and yet to give the alliance a warlike direction. If he were to adopt a policy frankly warlike, he would repel Lord Aberdeen and endanger the alliance. If he were to be frankly pacific, there would be a danger of his restoring to Europe that tranquillity which could not fail to bring him and his December friends into jeopardy. In this strait he did not exactly take a middle course. By splitting his means of action he managed to take two courses at the same time. There are people who can write at the same time with both hands. Politically, Louis Napoleon had this accomplishment. With His dipio- ■T • p macy seems his left hand he seemed to strive alter peace ; pacific: with his right he tried to stir up a war. The Ian-