Page:The invasion of the Crimea Vol 6.djvu/71

 DISPOSITION OF FORCES. 27 part it was owing to a faulty disposition of their chap troops. ]>y causing an undue detennination of L_ strength towards the circumference of the position, General Canrobert exposed both the French and the English forces to the contingency of being thus heavily overmatched in numbers, and of being overmatched, not merely for a brief period, but during a long succession of hours, which might include the crisis of a battle, and the fate of the Invaders. Enamoured of the commanding position afforded by the Sapoune Heights, he seemed to forget that the stronger the ground, the less was there need for loading it with troops ; and instead of merely watching and guarding this part of his extended border-land by the ordinary means, he strove to hold it fast by the bodily presence of so many thousands of men as to leave iiimself without any reserve of infantry with which to act from a centre. III. In order to make a full use of the tempting The enemy's occasion thus offered him, the (snemy constructed npiirly a fortnight before the battle, he was able to give the Home Govfriiment an admirably close estimate of the numbers with which he could fight such a battle as the battle of Inker- man. ' When these [the infantry effectives] have furnished the ' guards and working parties for the trenches, there remain in ' camp available for the sujijiort of those in advance in case of ' a sortie, and for the maintenance of our ])osition, wJiich is as- ' satiable on mir extreme right and right rear, something under ' 8000 men. '^Private letter of Lord Raglan to Duke of New- castle, Oct. 23, 1854.