Page:The invasion of the Crimea Vol. 8.djvu/398

 366 APPENDIX. • [Niel] a juge" trop aventuree l'attaque de vive force a faire ' immediatemcnt sur la tour Malakof, et a la suite dun conseil ' tenu en sa presence chez le General Canrobert, il a etc decide ' i pie nous allions entreprendre de ce cote les travaux d'une ' attaque plus rapprochee. ' — Quoted Rousset, vol. ii. pp. 32, 33. Note 5. — To Vaillant, 8fh February I S55.— Writing on the 8th of February (when it was understood that Niel was on the point of returning to France), Bizot says to Vaillant, the Minister of War: 'Le General Niel qui doit s'embarquer sur le prochain ' courrier va vous arriver parfaitement edifie sur nos travaux, sur ' nos chances de succes comme sur les chances contraires, et sur ' les difficulty de la position que nous ont faite nos allies. II a 1 essaye vainement de galvaniser leur inertie, et il a reconnu que 1 si nous voulions arriver, il faillait marcher pour eux, et pour ' nous.' — Quoted Rousset, vol. ii. p. 32. NOTES TO CHAPTER VL Note 1. — Grave affair. — 'General Niel regards it [the opening 'of the fire] as a grave affair, and so in truth it is.' — Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, March 31, 1855. It may be asked why, if the French commander was privately resolved to abstain from assaults, either he or his messenger Niel should regard the bombardment as a 'grave affair '; but to those who have read the foregoing fourth chapter the answer will readily occur. General Canrobert was possessed with a notion — not shared, I believe, with Lord Raglan — that the bombardment would or might pro- voke a second and more terrible ' Inkerman.' Thus, when he and Lord Raglan concurred in regarding the intended bombard- ment as a ' grave affair,' they concurred on different grounds — General Canrobert concurring on the ground last stated, and Lord Raglan concurring because he took it for granted that the bombardment would be followed by assaults. Niel personally, as was afterwards known, strongly objected to the bombardment; but mainly, it would seem, on the ground that it might draw on the Allies into acts of vigour which he thought would prove vain. Then again it perhaps may be asked why the French expended time and resources on this immense cannonade without meaning to follow it up. They may possibly have cherished some hope that the mighty fire brought to bear on the enemy's earthen de- fences would either force the enemy to capitulate, or retreat from the place without lighting ; but another and yet stronger motive for resorting to this cannonade was the evident necessity whicb