Page:The invasion of the Crimea Vol. 4.djvu/500

 470 APPENDIX. 19. It may be luoeivud as a fixed inaxiin in •var that ai) army entrenched in a strong position behind works mounting artillery is unassailable by a front attack. If the Hanks are secure, as in the case of Sebastopol, and the position cannot be turned, the usual course is to blockade and cannonade the enemy until the combined effect of the fire and shortness of supplies forces him to yield the ])Osition. 20. The circumstance of two armies tluis confronting one another lias received several illustrations lately, and invariably with the same result. The Confederate lines before Richmond, and the present con- test at Humaite between the South American States are examples in point. I am not aware of any instance in which an enemy so situ- ated has succumbed to an attack by open force before Ids artillery has been silenced. On the other hand, there are many instances in which the attacking force has been beaten off even after the artilleiy of the jilace had been silenced. 21. It is true that it has been denied by the Russian writers that an army, properly so called, was in the place when we arrived before it, and a great outcry has been raised against Prince Mentschikotf for his imputed desertion of the place, and his march upon Sym- l>heropol. In the attempt to decry his proceedings, the party of Prince Gortschakoff have spared no efforts to show that the place was at the mercy of the Allies. According to my view of the matter. Prince Mentschikoff did exactly what was right. Having reinforced the garrison with four battalions, which, with the ordinary garrison and the seamen of the fleet, raised the force inside the place to a total of forty-four battalions, and rendered it secure from a coup de main, he took up a position which gave him the command of all the resources of the country, and retained his communication with the north and east, by which most of his reinforcements would arrive ; * while, at the same time, he held a position which was very threatening to the .Mlies, and forced them to keep in reserve a lai-ge —the fact being that (besides the artillery men serving the guns at the sea-forts, and the marines and sailors) the only force left in the place was an imperfect battalion of sappers, and 5000 'reserve' troops, or, as ] call them, ' militiamen.' Far from sufficing to prevent a co%(p de main, a force of this kind was just such as would be proper for maintaining order, and enabling General Mtiller to negotiate for the surrender of the place upon honourable terms. See ante, p. 101, and chap, vi., sect, ii . tad vi., and footnotes to do.
 * Sir John Burgoyne speaks of forty-four battalions left in Sebastopol,