Page:The invasion of the Crimea Vol. 4.djvu/499

 APPEXUIX. 4G9 15. Whether such works, mounting artillery, and with the whole Russian army behind them, reinforced by 18,500 seamen and the garrison of the place, could have been taken by a coup dc main I will leave to the judgment of others. I think it useless to argue the question, because I always maintained that, unless the Allies were strong enough to invest the place on both sides of the harbour, operations against tlie north side could have led to no useful result. The possession of the north side would not have given us the posses- sion of the south, in wluch lay all the resources of the place ; and the attempt of the Eussian Generals to affirm the contrary is incom- prehensible, with the experience before them of the position of affairs after the final assault on the 8th of September 1855. After that date the Allies held peaceable possession of the south side of the harbour, and blew up the docks at their leisure, without serious molestation from the enemy, although the Russian anny at the time occupied the north side of the harbour and all its batteries. 10. I fully believe that if my views on the propriety of making the south the point of attack had not been adopted by the Allied commanders, winter would have surprised us on the heights of the Belbec, mthout a harbour, and with a difficult line of operations to defend ; and that the safety of the whole Allied force would hae been seriously compromised. 17. I perceive that Jlr Kinglake states that Loid Raglan wislied to attack the north side, but quotes no authority for his statement. I can only say that he intimated nothing of the kind to me, and it would have been totally inconsistent with his character to suppose that he would yield so quietly to a proceeding of which he disapproved. 18. The next point of difference between myself and the Russian Generals falls upon the question of an immediate assault upon the south side of Sebastopol when we arrived before it. Upon this subject I have not the advantage of the logic of facts as upon the question of the advisability of selecting the south as the point of attack ; but, ou the other hand, I have the benefit of occupying a perfectly independent position in discussing the question, not hav- ing been consulted as to the course to be pursued. I am in hopes that, not being under the obligation to defend a foregone conclusion, my reasoning will carry some weight in the difficult task before me of combating an idea which has obtained so great a hold of the public mind. I have no hesitation in avowing my thorough conviction that an immediate assault would have been an act of madness, and that the attempt would have resulted in our being beaten off with a very great loss of men.