Page:The invasion of the Crimea Vol. 4.djvu/497

 APPENDIX. 4G7 that many actions that have been severely commeuteJ ujion were really praiseworthy. 8. Many circumstances tended to make the attack on the Crimea a service of a peculiarly arduous character : — (1.) The necessity for it arose so suddenly that no time was avail- able for procuring any accurate information as to the state of pre- paration of the enemy to resist the attack ; and this was the more fL'lt from the remote position of the station and very little ordinary intercourse with it. (2.) The peculiar disadvantage which alwa3's attends such enter- prises when attempted by a landing from a fleet — the want of a stable base of operations from which to draw supplies, aud on which to effect a retreat, if necessary; while, on the other hand, all the resources of the country are in possession of the enemy. (3.) The climate, and the prevalence of an epidemic cholera in the army at the time. (•i.) The enormous evil of an army consisting of a combination of forces of ditferent nations, of which no one was in a decided pre- dominance. Although this evil was reduced almost to a minivium by the frank and courteous character of the commanders and most of the influential officers in the several services, still it could not be but sensibly felt. The customs, habits, and modes of proceeding neces- sarily differed, and gave cause for complaint, irritation, and want of that promptness and decision which are so necessary in the iield. 9. Up to a very recent period we have been ignorant of the exact amount of the Russian force in the Crimea. The history of the de- fence of Sebastopol, since published by the Russian General Todleben, supplies us with an authentic account of their military resources at the period of the expedition. It shows them to have been even stronger than the information then in the possession of the Allies had led us to expect. According to the Russian account. General Mentschikoff possessed at his disposal in the Crimea on the 13th of September 51,500 men, to which were added, after the destruction of the fleet, 18,500 seamen. They had, in addition, within Sebastopol, 2822 eflective pieces of artillery, of which upwards of 200 were mounted on the works, large stores of entrenching tools, and all the resources of a dismantled fleet and a great naval arsenal. It will thus be seen that, even in the number of men, the Russians were superior in strength to the whole allied force, which barely exceeded 60,000 men at the period of disembarkation, and consisted of a mixed army of French, English, and Turks. The invasion of a country pcsses- sing such military means by an arniy numerically inferior to their