Page:The invasion of the Crimea Vol. 4.djvu/290

 2G0 THK rART TO BE TAKEN C II A r. XI. ill a way that might be ventured by a com- mander who is able to risk, and risk frankly, the actual destruction of his squadron in an attack upon stone forts;* and if we are per- suaded to assail these sea-forts at all, we shall not engage in the business with that despeiatc purpose of running all hazards which alone could open out to us any even faint prospect of suc- cess. "We know, in effect, beforehand, that our attack of the sea-forts would be followed l)y no result which could be worthily called a victory for the naval forces. We know more. AVe know that, after a while, mere exhaustion of shot will bring our bombardment to a stop ; and yet, if we thus desist and sheer off without having first achieved the ruin or surrender of the forts which wo attack, our failure will be signal — will, in short, be a kind of defeat. Supposing that we give our aid in the attack of Sebastopol, the part we take will be this : Tor the purpose of effecting a diversion in favour of the land forces, we shall attack the forts in half earnest, yet at some cost of life and limb and naval strength. If that were all, we might willingly do as we are asked; but also — and there lies the precious sacrifice — we shall be wilfully en- countering a discomfiture. Can this be agreed could desire more passionately than Lyons did to bring the ])0vcr of the Navy to bear ujion the great enterprise, but from the moment when he attained the command of the fleet until the close of the war he never struck a blow at iScbastoiJol.
 * Duudas soon had a successor. No liviiif; man, I imagine,