Page:The invasion of the Crimea Vol. 4.djvu/247

 BY THE ALLIES. 217 it, has liarJly so close a bearing upon tlio question chap, ^ '■ VIII as it might seem to have at first sight; lor, power- L fill as is the separate navy both of France and of Enuland, there are causes from which it seems to result that the united fleets of the two powers are of less account for attack than the fleet of one acting singly. It may be that the difficulty of founding decisive action upon piebald councils of war is even more fatal to naval enterprise than to the operations of land forces. But, whatever be the cause, the lessons of history have hitherto "one to show that one of the wavs in which Eng- land may carry on war without gaining naval re- nown is by yoking herself with France. In the days when a base Stuart king was hired to engage his people in alliance with France, the English navy was strong, aud so was the navy of France ; yet the battles of Solebay aud Schonveldt gave proof that, acting together, the French and the English fleets might be hardly a match for the Dutck So, whatever may be the reasons for be- lieving Sebastopol to be impregnable by sea, they did not receive decisive confirmation from the fact that an Anglo-French fleet was lying outside for a year and a half without making any attempt to force its way into the roadstead. Still, we know, the conclusion of those who judged Sebastopol safe against an attack from the sea was never upset nor shaken by the subsequent course of events ; and it may be added perhaps that their reasonings were as sound as reasonings of the kind could well be ; for if an artillery adept