Page:The invasion of the Crimea Vol. 4.djvu/240

 210 THE COUXSELS OF THE ALLIES. CHAP, and tliG words of the subordinate will be regarded ^^^' as enabling us to conjecture the opinion of Lord Piaglan himself in regard to the consequences that must result from refusing at once to assault. Be that as it may, General Airey ventured a step, at the time, which shows that he had caught the full import — nay, already had divined the conse- quences of refusing to assault Sebastopol. What 4th Oct. he did, indeed, was only to write some two lines Afr"7's in a private letter; but, considering the place and letter to, /, , . • i • ii ^"i<i. the time, the purport of his communication, the personage to whom he addressed it, the events of the closing autumn, the appalling time which ibllowed, the complaints that soon rose in White- hall of the dearth of all warning information from the English Headquarters, and, finally, the re- turn of the spring, bringing with it accessions of strength — his words were, at the least, a singular forecast ; and to any who know how unlikely it was that he would be forming, and sending home, an opinion opposed to that of his chief, the letter will convey some idea of the light in which Lord Kaglan may have regarded the decision just taken. On the third day from that when the idea of a prompt assault was definitively rejected, General Airey wrote to Lord Hardinge, the Commander- in-Chief at the Horse Guards. He did not pre- sume to question the wisdom of the counsels which tlio Allies had been following; but he gave to the chief of the army at home what he judged I to be the probable consequence of the decision just taken. ' 'My own opinion,' he wrote — ' my