Page:The invasion of the Crimea Vol. 4.djvu/218

 188 THE COUNSELS OF THE ALLIES. CHAP. ' by delay, it cannot be commonly prudent for H3 ^^^- ' to hold back and give time. Well, but the one ' great exceptional circumstance which marks the ' existing condition of things is the evasion of ' Prince iNTentschikofl's army ; and this is an event ' of such a kind as to be a cause of despair to the ' garrison, unless they can get some delay, and an ' encouragement to us, if only we act at once. ' For, if it be true that to defend this entrenched ' position of four miles, nothing less than an t army is needed, and that the only army which ' could have been looked to for this duty has ' marched out and departed, along with its Com- ' mander-in-Chief, then it follows that the sailors, ' and the rest of the people thus left to their fate ' who may prove so brave and resolute as to be ' willing to take upon themselves the work of a ' whole army, and resist to extremity the attack ' of our victorious battalions, will be acting in a ' spirit of desperation. You say that, in defence, ' a spirit of mere desperation is sometimes for- ' midablc. That may be in a street, or a mountain ' defile; but it is hardly within the competence of ' the spirit of desperation or any other emotional ' impulse to hold a line of four miles against the ' Nor, indeed, is it clear that the vx'ork we see ' going on is undertaken with the single purpo.se ' of enabling the garrison to give us a hot recep- ' tion. The chiefs at Sebastopol who are directing ' these labours may rather be striving to prevent ' us from venturing the assault at all until it
 * resolute assaults of an army.