Page:The invasion of the Crimea Vol. 4.djvu/190

 IGO Iir.nOIC UKSISTAXCE of SKBASTOrOL CHAP. ' defence of the peninsula of the Crimea.'* But " surely, for the purposes of the war, the whole tolts"^^ ""^ w^orth of the Crimea lay centred in the fact that validity. jj. i,)cl^(le(J the mighty hutress which sheltered the Black Sea fleet ; and, for the General to let Sebastopol fall that he might husband his means i'or the defence of the peninsula, would have been, as it were, to stand by acquiescing whilst the heart was torn out, with a view to keep the strength needed for defending the rest of the body. And again, when the all but hopelessness of an endeavour to defend Sebastopol is assigned as the justificatiou for the withdrawal of the troops, it is hard to see why some 20,000 brave seamen, with- drawn from their natural element to do the work of land forces, should have been left to meet their fate in a conflict which was thought to be one too desperate to allow of its being undertaken or even shared in by the army under Prince Meutschikoff. Apparently, the soundest defence of Prince Mentschikoff's ])lan of a flank march was the one which he himself offered when he assured Korni- lofif that the adoption of it would enable him to operate formidably upon the flank and rear of the Tuediately followed by this one : ' Nevertheless he still pre- ' .served the hope that, if the irresolution of the Allies and the ' desperate courage of our sailors should make it possible to ' keep the enemy in check before Sebastopol for some time, the ajiology for Prince McntscliikofT's fliink march will be found nt length iu the Appendix.
 * Todleben, vol. i. p. 242. The passage in the text is iiii-
 * army, after receiving reinforcements, might be able to stop the
 * ulterior successes of the Allies.' General de Todleben's