Page:The invasion of the Crimea Vol. 3.djvu/448

 422 APPENDIX. us a makeshift was attended villi success so Liilliaiit that it -was not only acted upon by France herself throughout the revolutionary Avar, but was adopted by all the Con- tinental Powers which came into conflict with her ; and until the English displayed to them once more the line formation, Bonaparte and the other imitators of Dumouriez were encountered by nothing but their own system — their own system, worked out with inferior ability, and with means to which the system was ill adapted. Dumouriez's system is the one still used by France, and still rendered necessary by the manner in which the French army is constituted. A French general goes into action probably with a strong proportion of cavalry, but certainly with a very powerful artillery. lie also has several Zouave, Chasseur, or other choice regiments, well fitted for skir- mishing and for close, bold fighting in villages, enclosures, and broken ground ; but a great part of the rest of his army consists of masses, the fruit of the conscription — masses which may be so displayed as to give an appearance jf impending strength, but which, he well knows, must not be placed in any very trying situation. Thus provided and thus clogged, he tries to make such a ise of his artillery and of his choice regiments as shall avert any extended con- jlici between formed hattulions. If he can do that {he did so in the Italian campaign of 1859, but at the horrible cost of sacrificing his choice regiments), he will have a very good chance of winning the battle, llis difficulties, how- ever, are likely to be increased by the progress of modern invention ; for the new artillery is making it hard for him to know where to place the less impetuous part of his army.