Page:The invasion of the Crimea Vol. 3.djvu/447

 APPENDIX. 421 does not scruple to utter a direction to troops in a moment of crisis without having any authority to do so. Whe- ther the dangerous visitor really escapes identification, or whether men who have recognised him choose to hold their tongues on the subject from motives of ])rudence or good nature, I cannot say ; but the subject is one which in the event of a war would deserve very careful attention; for a wrong and unauthorised direction to troops in the critical moments of a fight must, of course, be beyond measure mischievous, and may prove to be a cause of disaster. It would apparently be easy to provide for the identification of all mounted officers not acting with their regiments; and other obvious means might be suggested which would have the effect of averting the evil. NOTE VII. Eespectixo some of the Conditions which may ixter- FERE with the DeSIRE TO FiGUT IN LiNE. The power which a nation may have of fighting in line depends, perhaps, mainly upon the constitutional tempera- ment of its people, but in some degree also upon the question whether the high quality of its Soldiery is fairly spread through the bulk of its arm}'. jS"o nation can expect to be able to fight in line if the prowess of its people is so abundantly gathered into the choice regiments as to leave the rest of the army in a condition of recognised inferiority. In Sir George Cathcart's book there is an interesting statement both of the causes which deprived the French of the power of fighting in line, and of the manner in which the predicament was met by the genius of Dumouriez. The system which JJumouriez contrived