Page:The invasion of the Crimea Vol. 3.djvu/433

 APPENDIX. 407 early part of the work — a part prepared evidently with much more elahoration than the account of the battle — the Official Narrative gives the numerical strength appertaining to the 42 battalions, the IG squadrons, the 9 sotnias, and the 84 guns which were under the direct command of Prince MentschikofF on the 13th of September 1854, and there shows that, although 12 of the guns and 2 of the sotnias of Cossacks, and the body of Sappers, acceding to Mentschikoff before the battle were not in hand on the 13th, the strength even then was 38,597.* Except that the Sappers were afterwards added, and that one battalion of * Lithuania ' and another of ' Wiiiia ' were replaced by an equal number of other battalions, i.e., by two battalions of sailors, the 42 battalions of infantry shown to have had a strength of 38,597 on Wednesday the 13th of September appear to have been identical with those 42| battalions which, according to the same official authority, were gathered just seven days afterwards on the banks of the Alma ;t and I think it must be acknowledged that, in the absence of any epidemic, or any engagement with an enemy, the falling off of the strength from 38,597, or rather from 39,000, X to 33,600 within the short period of seven days, is a circumstance requiring a detailed explanation. § The number of 38,597 approaches to the number I give — viz., 39,251, and will observe that (with the requisite additions mentioned in the next footnote but one) the 38,597 would be brought up to a number substan- tially equalling the result of my computation. t Compare the Table No. 8 in the Ajipendix to the ' Defense de Sebas- • topol ' with the Table 13. X I say 39,000, because, if the number of the Sappers, and of the 2 sot- nias of Cossacks of the artillerj-men serving the 12 additional guns were added to the 38,597, it would bring the numbers to more than 39,000. § 1 had once a conversation on this subject with the illustrious Gen- eral lie Todleben ; but we had not the figures before us. What I gathered was that he had relied upon some statements satisfying him that by leav- ing behind weakly men, the strength actually present on the Alma L^id been reduced to the number shown in the ' Defense.'
 * ' Defense de Sevastopol,' p. 140. The reader will see how closely that