Page:The history of Rome. Translated with the author's sanction and additions.djvu/290

270 position aloof from his order, and the spirit of the noble in him must have been far more powerful than that of the magistrate. Indeed, if at any time by way of exception a patrician disinclined to the rule of the nobility was called to the government, his official authority was paralyzed, partly by the priestly colleges which were pervaded by an intense aristocratic spirit, partly by his colleagues, and was easily suspended by means of a dictatorship; and, what was of still more moment, he wanted the first element of political power, time. The president of a commonwealth, whatever plenary authority may be conceded to him, will never gain possession of political power if he does not continue for some considerable time at the head of affairs; for a necessary condition of every dominion is duration. Consequently the influence of the senate appointed for life, which even during the regal period must not be estimated as insignificant, inevitably under mere annual rulers acquired such an importance that their constitutional relations became precisely inverted; the senate substantially assumed to itself the powers of government, and the former ruler sank into a president acting as its chairman and executing its decrees. In the case of every proposal to be submitted to the community for acceptance or rejection, the practice of previously consulting the senate and obtaining its approval, while not constitutionally necessary, was consecrated by use and wont; and it was not lightly deviated from. The same course was followed in the case of important state-treaties, of the management and distribution of the public lands, and generally of every act, the effects of which extended beyond the official vear; and nothing was left to the consul but the transaction of current business, the initial steps in civil processes, and the command in war. Especially important in its consequences was the innovation, by which neither the consul, nor even the otherwise absolute dictator, was permitted to touch the public treasure except with the consent and by the will of the senate. The senate made it obligatory on the consuls to commit the administration of the public chest, which the king had managed or had it at any rate in his power to manage himself, to two standing subordinate magistrates, who were nominated by the consuls and had to obey them, but were, as may easily be conceived, much more dependent than the consuls themselves on the senate (P. 260). It thus drew into its own hands the management of finance;