Page:The history of Rome. Translated with the author's sanction and additions.djvu/288

268 longed only to the freeholder) as on account of the right of appeal, which was intended to be conceded to the plebeian, but not to the sojourner or the foreigner—to express more precisely the conditions of the acquisition of plebeian rights, and on the other hand to discriminate the now enlarged burgess-body from those who were non-burgesses. To this epoch therefore we may trace back, in the views and feelings of the people,both the invidiousness of the distinction between patricians and plebeians, and the strict and haughty line of demarcation between cives Romani and aliens; but the former civic demarcation was in its nature transient, while the latter political one was permanent, and the sense of political unity and rising greatness, which was thus implanted in the heart of the nation, was expansive enough first to undermine and then to carry away with its mighty current those paltry distinctions.

It was at this period moreover that law and edict were separated. The distinction indeed had its foundation in the essential character of the Roman state; for even the regal power in Rome was subordinate, not superior, to the law of the land. But the profound and practical veneration, which the Romans like every other people of political capacity cherished for the principle of authority, gave birth to the remarkable rule of Roman constitutional and private law, that every command of the magistrate not based upon a law was at least valid during his tenure of office, although it expired with that tenure. It is evident that in this view, so long as the presidents were nominated for life, the distinction between law and edict must have practically been almost lost sight of, and the legislative action of the public assembly could acquire no development. On the other hand it obtained a wide field of action after the presidents were changed annually; and the fact was now by no means void of practical importance, that, if the consul in deciding a process committed a legal informality, his successor could institute a fresh trial of the cause.

It was at this period, finally, that the provinces of civil and military authority were separated. In the former the law ruled, in the latter the axe: the former was governed by the constitutional checks of the right of appeal and of prescribed delegation; in the latter the general held an absolute sway like the king. It was an established principle,