Page:The guilt of William Hohenzollern.djvu/86

82 a thing which is imperative, as Count Tisza has shown in his speech recently, it is certainly mysterious why one should not have formulated such demands as would make a breach with Serbia unavoidable. If the matter comes to nothing, like the shooting at Hornberg, and stops at a so-called diplomatic success, the idea already prevailing in this country, that the Monarchy is no longer capable of any exhibition of strength, will be strongly confirmed. The consequences that this will have at home and abroad are very obvious."

The representatives of German diplomacy in Vienna were thus not quite satisfied with Berchtold, and had not complete confidence in him. Not, however, because he had urged on war, and they had warned against it, but because they feared that "the Monarchy" was no longer capable of any "exhibition of strength," and the whole business, instead of ending with a rattling good war (mit einem frisch-fröhlichem Krieg) would end with a bloodless diplomatic victory.

Unfortunately the fears which the Secretary to the German Embassy expressed to the German Secretary of State with regard to their Austrian ally were completely without foundation.

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AUSTRIA'S HESITATION
}} After the German Government had, on July 5th, given its blessing to the war planned by Austria against Serbia, it insisted on attacking as quickly as possible. It was, however, no easy matter to stir Austria out of her easy-going ways.