Page:The guilt of William Hohenzollern.djvu/37

Rh growing up at home among the Rumanians and Yugo-Slavs, who were particularly oppressed by the ruling classes in Hungary, a strong Serbia and Rumania seemed to the leaders of Austro-Hungarian policy a highly dangerous development. To the agrarian party in the Monarchy—and again more particularly to the Hungarian section—the agrarian export territories of Serbia and Rumania were a thorn in the flesh. Finally, to the imperialists, militarists, bureaucrats and capitalists of Austria, who all desired to control the road to Salonika,  the existence of an independent Serbia appeared an  obstacle which they could not but desire to remove.

The policy of all these Austrian elements forced Serbia and Rumania into the arms of Russia.

While the Austrian statesmen believed that they had to crush Serbia in order to bolt the door against Russian intrigues in the Balkans, the true state of the  case was exactly the reverse. It was just through Austria's hostility that Russian influence was strengthened.

To eliminate it, the leaders of Austrian policy would have had to pursue a policy of concessions to the Serbs and Rumanians in Austria, and also towards the neighbouring States of Serbia and Rumania. Such a policy was impossible to the rulers of Austro-Hungary. To save the State on these lines they would have had to act contrary to their own interests of the moment.

If the national democratic and proletarian opposition in Austria failed to bring about the downfall of these rulers, then Austria was doomed, just as Turkey was; and doomed also was anyone who had bound himself to this State for weal or woe.

At the same time Austria felt itself as a Great Power, wished to behave as if it were independent, and made Rh