Page:The guilt of William Hohenzollern.djvu/197

Rh departments also, to prevent Austria mobilizing her whole army, and especially the troops stationed in Galicia, in order not to cause a counter-mobilization by Russia automatically, which would then force us and France to similar measures, and would thus conjure up a European war.”

Unfortunately Eisner omitted this passage. It is intended to be evidence of Germany's love of peace. It certainly says that Germany did not want a European war at any price, but only the Serbian war; it says something else, however, namely, that if Austria mobilized, this must “automatically” produce Russian mobilization, which would then conjure up a European war.

This “automatically” may be taken to heart by those who say that Russia mobilized quite without reason, and thus showed that she wanted war.

One to whom it was a question of peace in all circumstances ought not, of course, to have allowed a declaration of war on Serbia. Once this fateful step had been taken, an atmosphere of unrest was created which produced general mobilization as a result. If it was desired to avoid this, then at the very least they ought to have kept within the framework of the programme developed in the Bavarian Report: Austria should have been prevented from mobilizing in a way which would disturb Russia.

This they omitted to do. The Austrian mobilization was fairly well concealed, but Bethmann-Hollweg confessed even in his war speeches on August 4th, when he talked of the Russian mobilization, and declared it not to be justified: