Page:The guilt of William Hohenzollern.djvu/180

176 that the Austrian mobilization was to blame for this."

On this William writes a long essay:

"If the mobilization can no longer be cancelled—which is not true why, then, did the Tsar appeal for my intervention three days later, without mentioning the issue of the order for mobilization? Surely this shows clearly that even to him the mobilization appeared premature, and he afterwards took this step toward us pro forma to calm his awakened conscience, although he knew that it was no longer of any avail, as he did not feel himself strong enough to stop the mobilization. For this leaves me without the slightest doubt any longer: England, Russia and France have agreed taking as a basis our casus fœderis with Austria—using the Austro-Serbian conflict as a pretext, to wage a war of destruction against us. Hence Grey's cynical observation to Lichnowsky: that so long as the war remained confined to Austria and Russia, England would stand aside, but only if we and France became involved he would be forced to become active against us, i.e., either we are basely to betray our Ally and abandon her to Russia and thus break up the Triple Alliance, or, remaining faithful to our Ally, are to be set upon by the Triple Entente together and chastised, by which their envy will finally have the satisfaction of completely ruining all of us. This, in a nutshell, is the true, naked situation, which, slowly and surely set in motion and continued by Edward VII., has been systematically developed by disclaimed conversations of England with Paris and