Page:The guilt of William Hohenzollern.djvu/139

Rh first days after the delivery of the Ultimatum aroused even among neutrals a justified and growing mistrust in its honesty and love of peace.

But on the 28th July we see in preparation a change in its determined sabotage of every effort for peace. {{center|

THE BEGINNING OF UNCERTAINTY IN GERMANY
}}

We have already learned that the German Government did, indeed, desire war with Serbia, and did not shrink from war with Russia and eventually with France; but at the same time it urgently needed to have its own people behind it, Italy by its side, and England not against it.

This was made uncommonly difficult by the clumsiness and obstinacy of Austria on the one hand, and by the sagacity of Serbia on the other.

When William read the reply given by Serbia to the Austrian Ultimatum of the 25th, he had to confess that thereby his cause was put very much in the wrong. At this he was visibly displeased.

He read the reply of the Serbian Government on July 28th, and added the comment:

""A brilliant achievement for a time-limit of only forty-eight hours! This is more than one could have expected. A great moral success for Vienna, but it removes every ground for war, and Giesl might have stayed quietly in Belgrade. On this score I should never have advised mobilization.""

Nevertheless, this did not prevent him from declaring in his speech from the Throne on August 4th: