Page:The guilt of William Hohenzollern.djvu/126

122 On July 27th, Herr von Jagow had the nerve to tell the French Ambassador in Berlin that he had not yet found time to read the Serbian answer.

It was not easy for the Great Powers to feel their way, in view of this procedure. But, however little time they had to come to an understanding among themselves, one thing was immediately clear: the world-peace was threatened in the extreme if it came to a war between Austria and Serbia. As much as Austria urged on this war (and Germany along with her, which, of course, nobody knew at the time), just as much did Russia, France and England try to prevent it. Not because their rulers were unmitigated angels of peace but because Russia and France were inadequately equipped for war. And England, too, was hampered by her Irish affairs. So far, therefore, the Central Powers had been right in their calculations. Hence the Powers unanimously agreed to seek to obtain from Austria an extension of the time-limit fixed for the answer on the one hand, and, on the other, to advise Serbia to yield. France, as well as Italy and England—nay, even Russia herself—exerted themselves in this direction as far as it was possible with the shortness of the time.

With Germany's tacit co-operation, Austria refused any extension of time. Serbia's answer, however, as already mentioned, turned out to be extremely accommodating. Nevertheless, on the 25th Austria broke off diplomatic relations, began immediately to mobilize, and declared war on July 28th. On the 29th she bombarded Belgrade. Each of these steps was a fresh provocation, each added something to the general excitement, and raised fresh obstacles to every peaceful solution. Nevertheless, Austria unwaveringly pursued the path she had taken, and was therein supported by